South America

Op-EdPanamaVenezuela

Washington Revives the Fourth Fleet: The Return of U.S. Gun Boat Diplomacy to Latin America

• Administration not bothering to conceal implicit threat to the region

• After ignoring Latin America for most of his Presidency, Bush dispatches the Navy

• The steady remilitarization of Panama may provide a safe haven for the revitalized fleet

• FTA with Panama could grant U.S. access to canal zone military facility for Fourth Fleet

• Correa facetiously suggests that Manta be moved to Colombia

The dearth of diplomatic content in the April 24 Pentagon announcement left little mystery regarding the purpose behind Washington’s decision to reestablish the Fourth Fleet to patrol Latin American and Caribbean waters. As Washington shifts its attention back to the Western Hemisphere, it will have to grapple with issues that have been on the back burner for more than a decade. The return of the Fourth Fleet, largely unnoticed by the U.S. press, appears to represent a policy shift that projects an image of Washington once again asserting its military authority on the region, coincidentally coinciding with the announcement that Brazil has just launched a military initiative, the Conselho Sul-Americano de Defesa, embracing two of its neighbors with whom Washington has chilly relations.

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ColombiaPanama

Colombia: Uribe, Extradition, and the Fight for Justice

Extradition of Colombian paramilitary defendants to the US could ironically endanger peace process
Speculation on the motivations behind Uribe’s undermining his own Ley de Justicia y Paz
Recommendations for the defense of Colombian victims of injustice

Controversial Extradition

On Tuesday, May 13, President Uribe approved the extradition of 14 Colombians to the United States who face drug trafficking charges. While the Uribe administration has overseen the transfer of more defendants to the US than any other president in Colombia’s history, the most recent series of handovers is perhaps the most controversial. Among the group are some of the highest ranking leaders of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), a brutal rightist paramilitary force which has been a principal actor in the country’s long running civil conflict as well as the perpetrator of some of the war’s major massacres and other human rights abuses. According to Uribe, the extradition of the AUC senior leaders was necessary because of the repeated failure to cooperate with Colombian investigators in sharing information about their crimes and a lack of willingness to surrender their illegally attained assets. Uribe also cited the continued participation of the former paramilitary leaders in illegal activities, such as narcotrafficking, even after they submitted to being detained.

Despite these justifications, many observers question Uribe’s decision to forego the judicial mechanisms previously established by the passage of Law 925, also known as La Ley de Justicia y Paz. A crucial part of the demobilization process which has resulted in the reintegration of thousands of former combatants into civil society, the law was intended to encourage the country’s reconciliation process. It mandates that participants in Colombia’s civil conflict may confess their crimes and make only token reparations to victims or their families in exchange for a maximum sentence of 8 years. If the accused does not confess or make reparations, they are to be turned over to the Colombian judicial system to be tried, with the important distinction that any convictions made would lack maximum sentencing limits. Like Uribe, the United States seems very much in favor of the reversal of direction of a law that both enthusiastically supported upon its passage in 2005.

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