Press Release: Peru’s Presidential Election and the Approaching Run-Off

Results now being assessed from the first round of Peru’s presidential election are expected to deliver a strikingly different outcome than what was widely predicted merely months ago. Former lieutenant colonel and quirky leftist candidate Ollanta Humala led the race with 31.37 percent of the popular vote. Keiko Fujimori, daughter of now jailed Peruvian autocrat Alberto Fujimori, trailed Humala with 23.22 percent of ballots cast. The other three top candidates—former president Alejandro Toledo, former IMF economist Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (PPK), and former Lima mayor Luis Castañeda—were all favored by the country’s center-right elites when it came to their political leanings. Many in the media have suggested that the three trailing candidates were too ideologically indistinct, fragmenting the aristocratic vote. This left Humala and Fujimori to compete for the remaining segments of Peruvian society, to whom they offered differing varieties of populist appeal. For many, this is an unfortunate outcome that could supplant reasoned political debate in the run-off on June 5 with emotionally-based responses to the two remaining candidates.

The stand-off between Humala and Fujimori is particularly gripping in that it demonstrates ongoing elements of the neoliberal fallout in Peru. While Presidents Belaúnde, Garcia, and Fujimori were all obedient disciples of the World Bank-prescribed Washington Census reforms that brought the appearance of macroeconomic stability to Peru, these measures failed to cope with the dire poverty and income inequality that have persisted in the country since the end of military rule in 1980. Despite an impressive average growth rate of 7 percent over the past five years and sizeable reductions in poverty, over a third of all Peruvians still live on less than $3 a day and lack running water. Such conditions have emboldened a populace eager for economic reform and a more equitable distribution of wealth. Harvard political scientist Steven Levitsky aptly noted that “[t]hirty seven to 38 percent in the polls say they want a radical change in the economic model. And then another third broadly agrees with the status quo but wants greater redistribution.”

Both Humala and Fujimori have attempted to respond to these desires, but from differing ends of the ideological spectrum. Humala has called for greater state control of the economy, specifically proposing higher taxes on transnational extractive companies and redrafting the constitution to facilitate such economic reforms. These statements have led to unwarranted fears of a Chávez-style political reform in Peru. While Humala and Chávez share an abiding skepticism of the neoliberal economic model, the former appears to have no intention of abolishing term limits or instituting large-scale nationalization of industry.

Meanwhile, Fujimori has called for higher taxes on mining companies to fund social programs, and has combined such proposals in the context of scrutinizing ongoing free markets and free trade. She has proposed building more prisons and instituting the death penalty for severe crimes. It would seem that Fujimori’s combined, if contradictory, message of expanded social programs with economic and physical security sits well with many for whom the terrorifying past remains a recent memory. Many Peruvians still see her father, not as a cutpurse, but as the one who restored security to the country after its deeply divisive civil conflict. Yet others fear a continuation of her father’s authoritarian brand of leadership, not to mention pardons for the jailed Fujimori and his numerous accomplices who have joined him in serving time for human rights violations.

The unfortunate reality of the Humala-Fujimori run off is that it has dramatically polarized the electorate in such a way that will ultimately discourage thoughtful debate on a host of important policy issues during the run-off. The ideological similarities of PPK, Castañeda, and Toledo in comparison to Fujimori and Humala obscured the finer details of the three trailing candidates’ policy proposals, and allowed Fujimori and Humala to make competitive appeals to the lower classes. Now it seems voters will act based on one of two impulses: an emotional repulsion to Humala or Fujimori, or a preference for either’s populist appeals. As a result, many Peruvians will vote as a means of obstructing one of the candidates instead of registering a decisive endorsement. Much of the elite strata of society see Humala as a great threat to enduring economic stability and growth, and favor Fujimori as the most apt leader to guide Peru along its path of economic development. Other voters cannot stomach the thought of another Fujimori in office while the memory of government-directed death squads and rampant corruption under her father is fresh.

It is intriguing to speculate on how a PPK presidency conceivably would have unfolded. PPK is a wealthy and esteemed technocrat who runs two NGOs that focus on social programs in the Amazon. One could argue that Peru’s need for greater economic equity would be better met under PPK than Humala or Fujimori—as a wealthy statesman and philanthropist, he would likely be less susceptible to corruption and more capable of rechanneling steady GDP growth to the large impoverished masses. While Humala’s rhetoric and physical appearance may appeal more to the nation’s large poor indigenous population, his lack of political experience and absence of congressional support may preclude him from being an effective leader. The worst-case scenario imagined by the many who oppose Fujimori would not only consist of a pardon for her father, but his possible return to Peru’s political life in his daughter’s administration.

Had the run-off been between one of the three centrist candidates and Humala or Fujimori, it is likely that more substantive political discussion would have come about in the ensuing June 5 run-off campaign, instead of forcing Peruvians to vote more out of opposition than affirmation. While Humala’s appeals of a more equitable version of free market economics are laudable and seem earnest, his lack of political experience could preclude him from being an effective leader. But, arguably, a win for Fujimori would be a truly unfortunate outcome, considering what a potential return to her father’s brutal style of government would represent. Indeed the elder Fujimori oversaw economic policies that helped stabilize macroeconomic conditions, yet also coexisted with his approval of brutal repression routinely seen in the country’s civil conflict and rampant corruption that was averse to democratic principles. For some, this election underscores the deep dynamic of populist politics in Peru: in the absence of a strong party system, elections are based on personalized appeals that are often fronts for self-serving politicians. Many who support the interests of the downtrodden indigenous poor fear that due to their lack of education, many impoverished indigenous Peruvians will inevitably be misled by clientelistic leaders who promise big reforms.

Perhaps esteemed novelist Mario Vargas Llosa’s inflammatory comparison of the Humala-Fujimori run-off with a choice between AIDS and cancer holds a fragment of truth, as the interests of the most needy Peruvians may not be met under Humala or Fujimori. The fact that these two candidates have prevailed in the first round underscores the complex reality of electoral politics in Peru—while a candidate such as PPK may have offered the best hope for steady growth and thoughtful redistribution, the country’s dark past of indigenous discrimination, social exclusion, and terrorism still play heavily into voter’s decision-making. The sad result will be that earnest debate of policy issues will be obscured as Humala and Fujimori move towards the center and the run-off election become another example of personality-based politics.