A Constructive Engagement with Cuba
TWTEA, enacted in anticipation of World War I in 1917, grants the president wide-reaching economic authority in times of war. In 1933, the act was extended to apply to national emergencies, only to be returned to an exclusively war-time power in 1977. It currently allows for the continuation of sanctions initiated in the 44 years between, as is the case with Cuba, which was declared an “international emergency” by President Kennedy in 1963, through annual renewal by the president. Cuba now stands as the only country subject to TWTEA, after the Bush administration declined to renew U.S. sanctions against North Korea in 2008 in exchange for Pyongyang’s agreement to release details of its nuclear program, and sanctions against Havana have been renewed annually by every president since Jimmy Carter.
Is Change in the Air?
While Obama’s election provided hope for a new direction in U.S.-Latin American relations, his vision for the region has been largely devoid of substance, and his administration’s policy has differed from its predecessors only in the grandiosity of its rhetoric. The coming expiration of the TWTEA presents a new opportunity for Obama to make good on his promises of hemispheric change, if only symbolically, which have thus far gone unfulfilled.
Obama introduced himself to the hemisphere in April when he attended the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad and Tobago. Many were enthralled at the mere sight of a U.S. president willing to listen, and not dictate, to other regional leaders. However, while Obama emphasized his interest in constructing a bright future, his public statements at Port of Spain tiptoed over the grim history of U.S. intervention in Latin America. Speaking at the Summit, Obama observed that “we must learn from history, but we cannot be trapped by it.” In this instance, though, learning requires the difficult process of acknowledging the malevolent ramifications of Washington’s past actions – a process which Obama has been reticent to undertake. Progress will remain fleeting until the U.S. recognizes the gravity of Latin America’s often bitter perspective on a long history of repeated U.S. interventions in their homes.
A recent example of the faltering commitment to change is Washington’s handling of the ongoing crisis in Honduras. The new administration failed to provide strong leadership after the June 28th military coup against the constitutionally-elected president Manuel Zelaya, and at best, its response has been fitful and inconsistent. While the membership of the Organization of American States called unanimously for “the immediate and unconditional return” of the ousted Zelaya, the first official statement from the White House failed even to clearly condemn the illegitimate seizure of power by the de facto regime. Both President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have since called for Zelaya’s return to office in support of the San José accords, but the administration has been all but silent on the repression currently taking place at the hands of the interim government.
Rather than immediately condemning the coup by cutting all extensions of aid, the administration delayed any decisive response. Finally, after Clinton’s meeting with Zelaya last week, the State Department announced that it would withhold all non-humanitarian aid, purportedly totaling more than $30 million, most of which arrives through conduits of the Millennium Challenge Corporation, USAID and the State Department. Despite this reduction, the IMF has disclosed that it will award the de facto government nearly $165 million, although public outcry has forced it to reconsider this appropriation. With the U.S. holding veto power in the IMF, this decision can only be viewed as carrying Washington’s tacit approval.
At the end of August, the Obama administration received near unanimous, if carefully contained criticism from UNASUR (Union of South American Nations) after the U.S. announced plans to increase its military presence in Colombia. Officially rationalized as an extension of the War on Drugs, South American leaders can only look at the extension of Plan Colombia with grave anxiety. This expansion will only further alienate them if Washington continues to assist in the militarization of the region. Such policy initiatives seem to contradict the multilateral approach Obama has elsewhere claimed to espouse.
New Beginnings or False Hopes?
Obama’s promises of new opportunities and partnerships have been virtually nonexistent when it comes to fleshing out actual policy, and, if anything, he has weakened the potential for novel regional initiatives. The coming expiration of TWTEA provides a fresh opportunity for the White House to begin to right the ship and build a policy of positive engagement with its neighbors.
It would be naïve to expect that the embargo will or could be lifted in one swift maneuver, prompting the immediate normalization of U.S.-Cuban relations. Given decades of exchange of raw propaganda and crude expectations, a thaw in relations will only be made possible through a series of incremental steps and positive gestures that are mutually reinforced by both sides. By removing restrictions on remittances and family visitation to the island in April, (which only took effect this past week), Obama initiated this process, but on too small a scale. Still, upon this foundation, Havana and Washington are now in talks to resume direct mail service, and bills in the House and Senate aimed at the revocation of the travel ban are receiving growing support.
Public calls for a reevaluation of the U.S.-Cuban relationship are steadily increasing. Several days ago, Amnesty International spoke out against the immoral nature of the embargo that, while initially aimed at destabilizing the Cuban government, has disproportionately affected the Cuban public by denying access to essential imports of food, medicine and medical equipment. Last Thursday, after a week-long trip to Cuba, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, a consistent rational actor when it comes to amelioration of Cuban-U.S. relations, voiced support for negotiations that could eventually lead to the lifting of the embargo.
Havana has made it clear that it is more than willing to enter into dialogue, but that it will not make any unilateral concessions. Given the rancorous history between the two countries, it only makes sense that the Obama White House should continue to extend its hand in anticipation of reciprocal gestures from Havana. While removing restrictions on remittances and family visitations was a constructive first step, it was a very modest initial move. Much bolder concessions are ultimately necessary – not only for Obama to fulfill his promises of a new era in U.S.-Latin American relations, but also in order to develop a Cuban policy which serves the needs of the Cuban people while also responding to the aspirations of the American public and the dictates of creative diplomacy.